Localization Threat Model¶

Outsourcing or crowdsourcing translation tasks to third parties introduces additional security and privacy risks. Unlike internal development teams, translators may have limited trust relationships with the organization and may operate from various jurisdictions. This model identifies and classifies threats associated with external translation contributors.

Key Assumptions¶

Translators may be contractors, volunteers, or agencies with varying levels of vetting.
Translators require access to Weblate.
Translation strings may contain sensitive content such as unreleased features, legal terms, or security messages.
The organization has limited control over translators’ local environments.

Threat Categories (STRIDE)¶

1. Spoofing¶

S1. Fake translator accounts impersonating legitimate contributors.
- Risk: Unauthorized access to projects or injection of malicious strings.
- Medidas mitigatórias:
  - Enforce strong authentication (2FA); see Autenticação de dois fatores obrigatória.
  - Verificar a identidade dos tradutores contratados.
  - Use role-based access to limit project scope; see Controle de acesso do projeto.

2. Tampering¶

T1. Malicious translations embedding harmful payloads.
- Risk: Injection of JavaScript, HTML, or format-string attacks if translations are not properly escaped.
- Medidas mitigatórias:
  - Apply strict input validation in Weblate. Enforcing quality checks like HTML inseguro might help. See Verificações de qualidade and Verificações forçadas.
  - Use automated security scanning for translation files in your CI.
  - Limit usage of dangerous markup from translation files. Depending on the used localization framework, this might be implicit, opt-in, or require a third-party library.
T2. Inserção de traduções enganosas.
- Risk: Users misled about application behavior (e.g., consent dialogs mistranslated).
- Medidas mitigatórias:
  - Perform peer review of critical strings; see Revisão por pares or Revisores dedicados.
  - Maintain style guides and Glossário to prevent manipulation.

3. Repudiation¶

R1. Disputes over malicious or poor-quality translations.
- Risk: Translators deny responsibility for injected issues.
- Medidas mitigatórias:
  - Todas as alterações feitas no Weblate são registradas.
  - Use Weblate with version control for immutable history.

4. Information Disclosure¶

I1. Leakage of unreleased product details.
- Risk: Translators gain early access to unreleased features or confidential terminology.
- Medidas mitigatórias:
  - Segment projects to limit access to sensitive strings.
  - Apply non-disclosure agreements with external agencies.
  - Delay translation of highly confidential strings until public release.
I2. Exposure of personal data within strings.
- Risk: Translators might access or misuse embedded user data.
- Medidas mitigatórias:
  - Avoid exposing real user data in source strings.
  - Use placeholders for sensitive fields.

5. Denial of Service¶

D1. Bulk submission of junk translations.
- Risk: Review queues overwhelmed; release timelines disrupted.
- Medidas mitigatórias:
  - Choose an appropriate workflow to match your team capacity. Personalização do fluxo de trabalho can allow you to tweak this on a language basis.
  - Configure automated translation quality checks; see Verificações de qualidade.

6. Elevation of Privilege¶

E1. The translator gains unauthorized project-wide or administrative rights.
- Risk: Escalation leading to tampering or data exposure.
- Medidas mitigatórias:
  - Apply the principle of least privilege.
  - Regularly review access rights and group memberships.

Asset Inventory¶

Source Strings: May contain unreleased product features or legal text.
Translated Strings: Output presented directly to end users.
User Data Placeholders: Names, emails, or IDs referenced in strings.
Access Credentials: Accounts for translators, agencies, or bots.

Trust Boundaries¶

Organization ↔ Translators: Authentication and role-based access must be enforced.
Translation Platform ↔ Source Control: Synchronization requires secured tokens/keys.
Translators ↔ Translation Platform: All input must be sanitized before integration into builds.
Platform ↔ End Users: Translations must be validated to prevent code injection.

Mitigation Summary¶

Enforce 2FA and RBAC for translator accounts; see Autenticação de dois fatores obrigatória.
Require non-disclosure agreements or contracts for professional translators.
Use automated quality/security scanning for translations; see Verificações de qualidade.
Perform peer review of critical strings; see Revisão por pares or Revisores dedicados.
Limit project visibility to reduce exposure of sensitive content; see Controle de acesso do projeto.
Regularly patch and harden your Weblate server. You might also consider Obtendo suporte para o Weblate.
Retain immutable version history for all translation changes in the version control system.

Conclusion¶

Third-party translators introduce unique risks compared to internal contributors. With proper technical, organizational, and contractual controls, organizations can mitigate these risks and safely integrate external translation services while maintaining product integrity and compliance.