Localization Threat Model¶

Outsourcing or crowdsourcing translation tasks to third parties introduces additional security and privacy risks. Unlike internal development teams, translators may have limited trust relationships with the organization and may operate from various jurisdictions. This model identifies and classifies threats associated with external translation contributors.

Key Assumptions¶

Translators may be contractors, volunteers, or agencies with varying levels of vetting.
Translators require access to Weblate.
Translation strings may contain sensitive content such as unreleased features, legal terms, or security messages.
The organization has limited control over translators” local environments.

Threat Categories (STRIDE)¶

1. Spoofing¶

S1. Fake translator accounts impersonating legitimate contributors.
- Risk: Unauthorized access to projects or injection of malicious strings.
- Mitigaciones:
  - Enforce strong authentication (2FA); see Autenticación en dos fases obligatoria.
  - Verifique identidades de traductores contratados.
  - Use role-based access to limit project scope; see Control de acceso al proyecto.

2. Tampering¶

T1. Malicious translations embedding harmful payloads.
- Risk: Injection of JavaScript, HTML, or format-string attacks if translations are not properly escaped.
- Mitigaciones:
  - Apply strict input validation in Weblate. Enforcing quality checks like HTML inseguro might help. See Comprobaciones de calidad and Comprobaciones obligatorias.
  - Use automated security scanning for translation files in your CI.
  - Limit usage of dangerous markup from translation files. Depending on the used localization framework, this might be implicit, opt-in, or require a third-party library.
T2. Inserción de traducciones engañosas.
- Risk: Users misled about application behavior (e.g., consent dialogs mistranslated).
- Mitigaciones:
  - Perform peer review of critical strings; see Revisión por pares or Revisores dedicados.
  - Maintain style guides and Glosario to prevent manipulation.

3. Repudio¶

R1. Disputes over malicious or poor-quality translations.
- Risk: Translators deny responsibility for injected issues.
- Mitigaciones:
  - Todos los cambios en Weblate están registrados.
  - Use Weblate with version control for immutable history.

4. Information Disclosure¶

I1. Leakage of unreleased product details.
- Risk: Translators gain early access to unreleased features or confidential terminology.
- Mitigaciones:
  - Segment projects to limit access to sensitive strings.
  - Apply non-disclosure agreements with external agencies.
  - Delay translation of highly confidential strings until public release.
I2. Exposure of personal data within strings.
- Risk: Translators might access or misuse embedded user data.
- Mitigaciones:
  - Avoid exposing real user data in source strings.
  - Utilizar sustitutivos para campos sensitivos.

5. Denial of Service¶

D1. Bulk submission of junk translations.
- Risk: Review queues overwhelmed; release timelines disrupted.
- Mitigaciones:
  - Choose an appropriate workflow to match your team capacity. Personalización del flujo de trabajo can allow you to tweak this on a language basis.
  - Configurar control de calidad de traducción automática; consulte Comprobaciones de calidad.

6. Elevation of Privilege¶

E1. The translator gains unauthorized project-wide or administrative rights.
- Risk: Escalation leading to tampering or data exposure.
- Mitigaciones:
  - Apply the principle of least privilege.
  - Regularly review access rights and group memberships.

Asset Inventory¶

Source Strings: May contain unreleased product features or legal text.
Translated Strings: Output presented directly to end users.
Sustitutivos de Datos de Usuarios: Nombres, correos.e o los ID referenciados en cadenas.
Access Credentials: Accounts for translators, agencies, or bots.

Trust Boundaries¶

Organization ↔ Translators: Authentication and role-based access must be enforced.
Plataforma de Traducción ↔ Control Fuente: Sincronización requiere tóquenes/claves aseguradas.
Translators ↔ Translation Platform: All input must be sanitized before integration into builds.
Platform ↔ End Users: Translations must be validated to prevent code injection.

Resumen Mitigante¶

Enforce 2FA and RBAC for translator accounts; see Autenticación en dos fases obligatoria.
Require non-disclosure agreements or contracts for professional translators.
Use automated quality/security scanning for translations; see Comprobaciones de calidad.
Perform peer review of critical strings; see Revisión por pares or Revisores dedicados.
Limit project visibility to reduce exposure of sensitive content; see Control de acceso al proyecto.
Regularly patch and harden your Weblate server. You might also consider Obtener ayuda con Weblate.
Retain immutable version history for all translation changes in the version control system.

Conclusion¶

Third-party translators introduce unique risks compared to internal contributors. With proper technical, organizational, and contractual controls, organizations can mitigate these risks and safely integrate external translation services while maintaining product integrity and compliance.