Modello di minaccia di localizzazione¶

Outsourcing or crowdsourcing translation tasks to third parties introduces additional security and privacy risks. Unlike internal development teams, translators may have limited trust relationships with the organization and may operate from various jurisdictions. This model identifies and classifies threats associated with external translation contributors.

Key Assumptions¶

Translators may be contractors, volunteers, or agencies with varying levels of vetting.
I traduttori richiedono l’accesso a Weblate.
Translation strings may contain sensitive content such as unreleased features, legal terms, or security messages.
The organization has limited control over translators” local environments.

Threat Categories (STRIDE)¶

1. Spoofing¶

S1. Fake translator accounts impersonating legitimate contributors.
- Risk: Unauthorized access to projects or injection of malicious strings.
- Mitigazioni:
  - Enforce strong authentication (2FA); see Autenticazione a due fattori forzata.
  - Verificare le identità dei traduttori a contratto.
  - Use role-based access to limit project scope; see Controllo degli accessi al progetto.

2. Tampering¶

T1. Malicious translations embedding harmful payloads.
- Risk: Injection of JavaScript, HTML, or format-string attacks if translations are not properly escaped.
- Mitigazioni:
  - Apply strict input validation in Weblate. Enforcing quality checks like HTML non sicuro might help. See Quality checks and Controlli forzati.
  - Use automated security scanning for translation files in your CI.
  - Limit usage of dangerous markup from translation files. Depending on the used localization framework, this might be implicit, opt-in, or require a third-party library.
T2. Inserimento di traduzioni fuorvianti.
- Risk: Users misled about application behavior (e.g., consent dialogs mistranslated).
- Mitigazioni:
  - Perform peer review of critical strings; see Peer review or Dedicated reviewers.
  - Maintain style guides and Glossario to prevent manipulation.

3. Ripudio¶

R1. Disputes over malicious or poor-quality translations.
- Risk: Translators deny responsibility for injected issues.
- Mitigazioni:
  - Tutte le modifiche in Weblate vengono registrate.
  - Use Weblate with version control for immutable history.

4. Divulgazione delle informazioni¶

I1. Leakage of unreleased product details.
- Risk: Translators gain early access to unreleased features or confidential terminology.
- Mitigazioni:
  - Segment projects to limit access to sensitive strings.
  - Apply non-disclosure agreements with external agencies.
  - Delay translation of highly confidential strings until public release.
I2. Exposure of personal data within strings.
- Risk: Translators might access or misuse embedded user data.
- Mitigazioni:
  - Evitare di esporre dati utente reali nelle stringhe di origine.
  - Use placeholders for sensitive fields.

5. Negazione del servizio¶

D1. Bulk submission of junk translations.
- Risk: Review queues overwhelmed; release timelines disrupted.
- Mitigazioni:
  - Choose an appropriate workflow to match your team capacity. Personalizzazione flusso di lavoro can allow you to tweak this on a language basis.
  - Configurare controlli di qualità automatizzati della traduzione; vedere Quality checks.

6. Elevation of Privilege¶

E1. The translator gains unauthorized project-wide or administrative rights.
- Risk: Escalation leading to tampering or data exposure.
- Mitigazioni:
  - Apply the principle of least privilege.
  - Regularly review access rights and group memberships.

Asset Inventory¶

Source Strings: May contain unreleased product features or legal text.
Translated Strings: Output presented directly to end users.
User Data Placeholders: Names, emails, or IDs referenced in strings.
Access Credentials: Accounts for translators, agencies, or bots.

Trust Boundaries¶

Organization ↔ Translators: Authentication and role-based access must be enforced.
Translation Platform ↔ Source Control: Synchronization requires secured tokens/keys.
Translators ↔ Translation Platform: All input must be sanitized before integration into builds.
Platform ↔ End Users: Translations must be validated to prevent code injection.

Riepilogo della mitigazione¶

Enforce 2FA and RBAC for translator accounts; see Autenticazione a due fattori forzata.
Require non-disclosure agreements or contracts for professional translators.
Use automated quality/security scanning for translations; see Quality checks.
Perform peer review of critical strings; see Peer review or Dedicated reviewers.
Limit project visibility to reduce exposure of sensitive content; see Controllo degli accessi al progetto.
Regularly patch and harden your Weblate server. You might also consider Getting support for Weblate.
Conserva la cronologia delle versioni immutabile per tutte le modifiche alla traduzione nel sistema di controllo della versione.

Conclusion¶

Third-party translators introduce unique risks compared to internal contributors. With proper technical, organizational, and contractual controls, organizations can mitigate these risks and safely integrate external translation services while maintaining product integrity and compliance.